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Despite growing industrialization, the shift to a cash economy and natural resource
overexploitation, indigenous people of the Amazon region hunt and trade wildlife in order
to meet their livelihood requirements. Individual strategies, shaped by the hunters’ values
and expectations, are changing in response to the region’s economic development, but
they still face the contrasting challenges of poverty and overhunting. For conservation
initiatives to be implemented effectively, it is crucial to take into account people’s
strategies with their underlying drivers and their adaptive capabilities within a transforming
socio-economic environment. To uncover hunting strategies in the Colombian Amazon
and their evolution under the current transition, we co-designed a role-playing game
together with the local stakeholders. The game revolves around the tension between
ecological sustainability and food security—hunters’ current main concern. It simulates
the mosaic of activities that indigenous people perform in the wet and dry season, while
also allowing for specific hunting strategies. Socio-economic conditions change while the
game unfolds, opening up to emerging alternative potential scenarios suggested by the
stakeholders themselves. Do hunters give up hunting when given the opportunity of an
alternative income and protein source? Do institutional changes affect their livelihoods?
We played the game between October and December 2016 with 39 players—all of them
hunters—from 9 different communities within the Ticoya reserve. Our results show that
providing alternatives would decrease overall hunting effort, but impacts are not spatially
homogenous. Legalizing trade could lead to overhunting except when market rules and
competition come into place. When it comes to coupled human-nature systems, the
best way forward to produce socially just and resilient conservation strategies might be
to trigger an adaptive process of experiential learning and scenario exploration. The use
of games as “boundary objects” can guide stakeholders through the process, eliciting
the plurality of their strategies, their drivers and how outside change affects them.
Keywords: wildmeat, hunting, role-playing games, wildlife management, Colombia, indigenous, alternative
livelihoods, companion modeling
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INTRODUCTION
In the tropical Anthropocene, hunting, and the trade of wildlife
still play a crucial role in the livelihoods of rural communities
(van Vliet, 2011; WHO and CBD, 2015; Nielsen et al., 2018).
More than 150 million households in Asia, Africa and Latin
America rely to some extent on wildmeat to meet their dietary
requirements and support their economies (Nielsen et al., 2018).
Tropical forest productivity for wildmeat is generally lower than
in open habitats (Robinson and Bennett, 2000). As a result,
overhunting is considered a major threat for biodiversity and
for the people that depend on it as a source of food and
income (Bennett and Robinson, 2000; Milner-Gulland et al.,
2003; Ripple et al., 2016). Hunting may have far-reaching
consequences on entire habitats, depleting species responsible
for key ecosystem functions such as seed dispersion, predation
and herbivory (Emmons, 1989; Wright, 2003). The effects are not
homogenous on the plant community as hunters tend to target
large-bodied vertebrates, which are more likely to disperse large-
seeded plants (Peres, 2007; Kurten, 2013). Selective hunting,
along with habitat fragmentation, has led many seemingly
“pristine” tropical forests to suffer from the “half-empty forest
syndrome” (Redford and Feinsinger, 2003).
While there is general consensus on the unsustainability
of hunting (Fa et al., 2002; Milner-Gulland et al., 2003; van
Vliet et al., 2015b; Ripple et al., 2016; Benítez-López et al.,
2017), assessing the impact of harvest remains a challenge. Static
sustainability indices and site comparison studies have often
proven very sensitive to model parameters and are ultimately
not appropriate for measuring the impact of hunting (Ling
and Milner-Gulland, 2006; Levi et al., 2009; Weinbaum et al.,
2013; van Vliet et al., 2015a). Sustainability studies need to
acknowledge the complexity of the hunting system, its spatial and
temporal heterogeneity and its inherent human componentmade
of the evolving needs and aspirations ofmillions of people around
the globe (van Vliet et al., 2015b).
Bringing harvest to sustainable levels means integrating both
social and environmental components of management as well
as their dynamic relationships in modeling efforts (Verburg,
2006). Effective and socially just conservation initiatives should
be guided not only by the best available information on
the resource but also by a deeper understanding of people’s
strategies, their drivers and their adaptive capabilities (Feintrenie
et al., 2010; Garcia et al., 2010; Bennett et al., 2016). The
need for more inclusive, community-based approaches to
conservation practice is widely recognized; however, their
implementation is still limited and performance remains
well-below expectations (Berkes, 2004; Bennett et al., 2017).
Centralized command and control approaches that alienate
local resource users are still prevalent but tend not to
be effective where weak, underfunded institutions fail in
enforcing the rules and simultaneously contribute to the
marginalization and poverty of rural communities (Brandon
et al., 1998; Barrett et al., 2001; Andrade and Rhodes, 2012;
Brockington and Wilkie, 2015). The simultaneous lack of
enforcement and criminalization of hunting and trade bare
the risk of encouraging hidden practices that—because of
their illegality—evade institutional control and restrictions
(Nasi et al., 2008; Duffy et al., 2016).
This reflects the current situation in Colombia where, despite
trade prohibition, wildmeat can be found in the markets of
rural as well as urban centers around the country (van Vliet
et al., 2014a). Decree 2811 from 1974 allows hunting of non-
protected species outside protected areas as long as it is for the
subsistence of the hunter and her or his family. For trading,
independently of the scale and purpose, hunters need an official
license, which is extremely complex if not impossible to get
for members of rural communities (van Vliet and Gomez,
2015). The institutional definition of subsistence in the legal
framework considers only food safety. Against this narrow
definition, the local concept of subsistence includes other needs
linked to housing, education and health, which can be covered
through trading part of the wildmeat. Despite its history of strict
conservations and the foreseen implementation challenges, the
current political debate in Colombia is favorable to sustainable
use models (van Vliet, 2016).
The Ticoya indigenous reserve, in southern Colombia, serves
as an example of these processes. The reserve’s local economy
relies mainly on shifting cultivation. Themain staple crops yucca,
plantain and corn are protein-poor and people complement
their diet by fishing and to a lesser extent by hunting (Eden,
1990; Maldonado, 2010; van Vliet et al., 2014b). Despite its
relative remoteness, the region is undergoing significant socio-
economic changes at an exceptionally high rate. Economic
development is affecting people’ diets as well. Processed food
products coming from Southern Brazil, the Peruvian Andes
and other areas of Colombia can now be easily found in the
reserve (van Vliet et al., 2014b). Because of all these factors,
local communities are relying more and more on the cash
economy and industrialized products. At the same time, their
cultural identity and indigenous rights over land and political
autonomy are increasingly acknowledged (van Vliet et al., 2018).
Yet in this emerging globalized society, local communities still
rely on their surrounding forest and—among other activities—
do hunt and trade wildlife in order to meet their livelihood
requirements (Bodmer and Lozano, 2001; van Vliet et al.
2015d; Bennett et al., 2016).
To ensure food security and strengthen cultural identity,
local hunters have created in 2016 Colombia’s first indigenous
hunters’ association: Airumaküchi (van Vliet, 2016). One of
Airumaküchi’s first objectives is to work toward sustainable use
of wildlife and it is therefore in their own interest to uncover
hunters’ strategies, with their driving values and aspirations. This
would not only urge institutions to acknowledge their effort and
adapt the legal framework for subsistence trade, but it is also
changing the way hunters are perceived by society.
Given the persistence of hunting and trading in Colombia,
the challenges to sustainability and the openness of the
national government toward sustainable use, there is a need
to better understand hunters’ decisions to ensure that future
conservation initiatives have the desired ecological and social
outcomes. Airumaküchi and our research team co-designed a
role-playing game—named TICOYA —to initiate and support a
learning and collective decision-making process around hunters’
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most relevant issue: how can they hunt sustainably, ensuring
biodiversity conservation, and food security under current
and future socio-economic conditions? We developed the
game following the Companion Modeling (ComMod) approach
(Étienne, 2013).We used the game to elicit hunters’ strategies and
their underlying reasons under different scenarios. The design of
the scenarios was guided by two hypotheses:
1. Providing hunters with income and diet alternatives will
reduce their harvest of wildmeat. This hypothesis is based on
the assumption that pressure on natural resources is linked
to poverty and a lack of alternative options (Brown, 2002),
although the impact of alternative livelihood projects are
unclear or rarely documented (Roe et al., 2015).
2. Legalizing trade will not trigger an increase in hunting
pressure because trade already occurs through hidden
channels and because hunters in Ticoya hunt for subsistence—
as defined locally—and not for commercial purposes.
These two hypotheses led to the formulation of four scenarios.
We specifically explore what drives hunters’ decisions when
(1) communities are isolated and wildmeat trade is illegal, (2)
communities have access to income and diet alternatives and
trade is illegal, (3) communities have access to alternatives and
trade is legal and finally (4) trade is legal and competition
is higher due to the intrusion of external hunters. A more
detailed description of the scenarios is given in the Materials and
Methods section.
Games, particularly role-playing games, help stakeholders
shed light on complex socio-ecological systems, their internal
dynamics and feedback mechanisms and the multiplicity of
perceptions (Basco-Carrera et al., 2017; Reibelt et al., 2017;
Redpath et al., 2018). Confronting players with their actions and
their impacts not only fosters understanding but also contributes
to strategic management, supporting people to think adaptively
and creatively in the face of the challenges encountered in
the game that reflect those of the real world (Barreteau et al.,
2011; Speelman et al., 2017). Within this context, role-playing
games follow a constructivist approach that does not aim at
finding definitive solutions but at triggering an adaptive process
of collective learning, exploration and experimentation (Xiang,
2013; Redpath et al., 2018). Games and simulations have already
been used to explore hunters’ behavior in different contexts
(Bousquet et al., 2001; Mathevet et al., 2007; Le Page et al., 2015;
Bodonirina et al., 2018;Marrocoli et al., 2018). To our knowledge,
this is the first study that looks at the effects of livelihood and
policy interventions within a setting codesigned by the local
hunters and the research team.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study Area
The study was conducted in the Colombian department of
Amazonas, a strip of land that stretches between Brazil and
Perú. The area, part of the so-called tri-frontier, stands out
as a dynamic region, where people, cultures, and goods flow
ceaselessly across the few roads and the many rivers (Schor and
da Costa Avelino, 2017). Specifically, this work was performed
within the boundaries of the Ticoya indigenous reserve and
FIGURE 1 | Map of the Ticoya indigenous reserve (in dark orange) and its
location in Colombia. Dots indicate the communities where the study was
conducted, from right to left: Puerto Esperanza, Puerto Nariño, Ticoya, Santa
Teresita, San Francisco, Doce de Octubre, and Tipisca. In green, partly
overlapping the Ticoya reserve, the Amacayacu National Park. One workshop
was organised in the proximity of Leticia along the National Route 85.
along the Leticia-Tarapacá road (Figure 1). The reserve (140
623 Ha) comprises a total of 22 communities located along the
banks of the Amazon, Loretoyacu, Amacayacu, Boyahuazu, and
Atacuari rivers. It was established in 1990 through INCORA
Resolution 021 (Ruiz, 2008) and is home to several indigenous
ethnic groups, mainly Ticunas, Cocamas and Yagua—the Ticunas
being the most numerous (Riaño, 2003; INEI, 2010). Amazonian
indigenous groups as well as non-indigenous people (colonos
and mestizos) have converged on the area during the past
century, attracted by a series of economic booms (such as
rubber, pelt, coca) or because they were displaced from their
original settlements (Ortiz, 1984; INEI, 2010). A section of
the Ticoya territory is shared with Amacayacu National Park
(ANP), which covers 293,500 Ha between the Amacayacu river
and the border with Peru (Franco, 2006). Most of the Ticoya
reserve is forested area classified according to the rivers’ flooding
regimes: the varzea forest is seasonally flooded by nutrient-
rich water, the swamp forest by nutrient-poor waters, while
the terra firme forest is never flooded (Moreno Arocha, 2014).
Such a forest mosaic sustains a rich and diversified fauna
which has been described mainly within the Amacayacu park
(PNNA, 2006; Maldonado, 2010). Outside the park borders,
information on wildlife richness and abundance originates
mainly from hunters’ offtakes and markets (van Vliet et al.,
2014a,c; Sandrin et al., 2016). Birds represent the most diverse
vertebrate group, with more than 450 species present. Among
the most detected are birds of the Cracidae family such as the
nocturnal curassow (Nothocrax urumutm—least concern) and
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the helmeted curassow (Pauxi Pauxi—endangered). Within the
reptiles, both caimans—such as the spectacled caiman (Caiman
crocodilus—least concern) and tortoises—such as the yellow-
footed tortoise (Chelonoidis denticulate—vulnerable) are present
in the region. The most numerous group of mammals is
represented by rodents, with the lowland paca (Cuniculus paca—
least concern) and the black agouti (Dasyprocta fuliginosa—
least concern) being rather common—and hunted—species. At
least three species of armadillos are present, including the
giant armadillo (Priodontes maximus—vulnerable) and about
12 species of primates such as the common wooly monkey
(Lagothrix lagotricha—vulnerable). Among the largest and most
valued mammals are the white-lipped peccary (Tayassu pecari—
vulnerable), the collared peccary (Pecari tajacu—least concern),
the red brocket (Mazama americana —data deficient), the gray
brocket (Mazama gouazoubira—least concern) and the lowland
tapir (Tapirus terrestris—vulnerable).
The main settlement of the Ticoya reserve—and second
largest municipality in the department after Leticia—is Puerto
Nariño. The inhabitants of the communities surrounding Puerto
Nariño as well as Leticia, base their subsistence mainly on
farming and fishing (Eden, 1990; Trujillo, 2008; Maldonado,
2010). Additional income is gained from the illicit trade of
coca and other forest products (mainly cedar—Cedrela spp) and
from the expanding tourism industry (Zárate and Ahumada,
2008). Though to a lesser extent compared to the other activities,
wildmeat hunting and trade significantly contribute to the local
economy as well as to the people’s diets (van Vliet et al.,
2015c). Irrespective of the purpose, any kind of trading is illegal
and hunters run the risk of paying fines and having their
catch confiscated every time they sell wildmeat. Despite the
prohibition, about 43% of the catch is sold, mainly to neighbors
within the same community and occasionally to restaurants,
schools, army soldiers and retailers (Quiceno-Mesa et al., 2014).
Animals traded are mainly mammals (60%), birds (26%), and
reptiles (14%). Most hunters use rifles for hunting although
other techniques such as traps, hunting with dogs and—to a
minor extent—blowpipes are also used (Sandrin et al., 2016).
Rifles, as well as munitions, are mostly illegally sourced but they
are generally tolerated if they are not carried around in the
urban centers.
Game Development
The game used in this study has been developed jointly by the
research team and the local hunters, following the ComMod
approach (Etienne, 2014). ComMod is an iterative, participatory
modeling approach based on the assumption that participation
of the local actors in the model design benefit not only the actors
themselves but also the researchers and the decision-makers.
Researchers and hunters repeatedly met in two field missions
in 2016 and 2017 to (1) understand and agree upon the main
issues at stake, (2) build a conceptual model identifying the
most relevant components in the system and (3) develop and
validate a role-playing game that allows stakeholders to discuss
creatively and constructively how to address the issues identified.
Although the co-design phase (1 and 2) triggers a learning
process helping stakeholders to share their own perceptions in
order to build a common vision of the socio-ecological system
(Bodonirina et al., 2018), we report here on the last phase of the
project: the implementation of the validated role-playing game in
the field.
The game recreates a simplified reality covering the main
dynamics related to hunting as elicited during the ComMod
process (Etienne et al., 2011). All game parameters have been
calibrated based on information collected during the diagnostic
phase through semi-structured interviews, collective workshops
and, to a lesser extent, via literature. Stakeholders participated
actively to every stage of the process and developed a sense of
ownership and commitment toward the objectives of the study.
Mutual trust was an essential ingredient for ensuring dialogue,
promoting learning, and supporting collective decision-making.
The study was done in compliance with the ethical guidelines
and principles outlined by the Swiss Commission for Research
Partnerships with Developing Countries (Stöckli et al., 2012).
Data Collection
We organized nine workshops at three separate locations with
40 different participants (35 men, 5 women) between October
and December 2017 (see Table S1 for more information on
participants). The selection of participants was organized by our
local partner, the hunting association Airumaküchi. As women
are mainly garden hunters (Linares, 1976; Smith, 2005) and
rarely engage in long-distance hunting, only five were part of
the workshops.
All participants were experienced hunters, with 31 of 40 being
members of the association. The total number of hunters active
within the Ticoya reserve is not known with accuracy given that
the definition of hunter is vague. Most inhabitants of the reserve
hunt opportunistically while fishing and farming while only a
fraction hunts regularly—except when presented with alternative
income activities. The number of members of Airumaküchi—
about 50 at the time of the study—is not an exact representation
of all active hunters but is a good proxy as the association
spent significant effort in promoting its activities throughout the
reserve. Moreover, many of the hunter members of Airumaküchi
are those who explicitly expressed willingness to work toward a
sustainable management plan. A voluntary engagement fosters
the building of trust and legitimacy, essential ingredients of a
ComMod approach.
Each workshop had a different set of participants, most
of them from Puerto Nariño or from close communities
along the Loretoyacu river. Only three participants were from
another indigenous reserve from the outskirts of Leticia, on
the incomplete road to Tarapacá. The communities within the
reserve along the Amazon river were not included in this study
as their residents rely mainly on fishing. Most of their territory
is indeed seasonally flooded by the Amazon river and hunting—
except for birds and caimans—is negligible.
Most of the participants were Ticunas (25), while the
remaining 15 participants consisted of Yagua (7), Cocamas (3),
Muinane (2), Bora (1) and one was a colono who had settled in
the region 34 years ago after fleeing from another department of
Colombia. All participants spoke fluent Spanish and most were
able to write and read, although this was not a prerequisite for
playing the game.
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Most workshops were organized in Puerto Nariño and
the participants were personally informed and invited a few
days before by the researchers and members of Airumaküchi.
Only two workshops took place in smaller and more remote
communities as this was logistically easier for all partners.
Traveling expenses were covered and lunch was provided at the
end of every workshop for all participants and their families. No
additional compensation was given.
Workshop Structure
Every workshop followed the same structure (Figure 2). First,
a facilitator explained the players’ targets and the rules of the
game. Then, two successive game sessions were played, each
under two different scenarios. Each scenario has two rounds,
representing the region’s two ecological seasons, characterized
as low water and high water. As the workshops were conducted
when the level of the Amazon river was at its lowest, the research
team always started the games with the low water round. We
encapsulated different time scales in one round. While for the
players a round represents approximately 1 month within the
respective season, and the players need to take decisions within
this timeframe, ecologically each round corresponds to the entire
season and animals reproduce and move accordingly. As the
game progressed, players needed to allocate effort to different
activities, possibly go hunting and consume or trade the wildmeat
harvested. After that, animals reproduced and moved within
the system. At the end of each game totaling four rounds, time
was allocated for in-depth debriefings. It is at this stage that
game and reality come together (Garcia et al., 2016); the players
carefully reflected upon their decisions and the resulting impacts
they experienced during the game and connected them with the
decisions and practices in their everyday life. Generally, each
workshop lasted between 4 and 5 h depending on the debriefing’s
depth and on the players’ commitments.
Game Structure
Each round, players have to fulfill a two-fold objective: a
livelihood requirement represented by a specific protein intake
(20 kg) and a budgetary (100,000 Colombian Pesos COP) target.
These goals are based on the monthly energy and income
requirement of a household composed of two adults, two children
and one elder (WHO, 1991).
To satisfy their targets, players have at their disposal two
currencies. Energy points represent their human capital, with
10 energy points given every turn to each player. Money, fake
bank notes with the same denomination as the Colombian Pesos,
represents financial capital. Each player receives 70,000 COP.
Players have to allocate their energy budget to a combination
of different activities: farming, fishing, hunting in four different
territories, logging and performing a salaried job to meet their
nutritional and income targets. All of them, except hunting and
fishing, return immediate monetary rewards. Fishing returns
a fixed amount of fish, depending on the amount of energy
invested. Hunting is a risky activity and not all hunting trips
are successful, the reward will depend on the prey—if any—
that is killed. If players choose to allocate part of their energy
to hunting, they need to decide whether to hunt in a territory
FIGURE 2 | Workshop structure.
closer or more distant to the village. Traveling—on foot and/or
by boat—to a certain territory, spending the night in the forest
and using rifles entails a certain cost. The price of hunting—as
well as the energy required to perform it—depends on the season,
on the territory chosen and on the game scenario (Table 1). The
scenarios represent situations reflecting important modalities of
the basic assumptions behind the study. A scenario dictates what
rules and options (activities) are in play and therefore represent
the context to which players will need to respond. The scenarios
were developed during the design phase of the project through
collective workshops and interviews.
In scenario 1, players live in a remote community and do not
have access to alternative sources of protein or to any paid job.
They can only perform subsistence activities (farming, fishing
and hunting) and can meet their protein target only by hunting
and fishing, or by buying fish or potential excess wildmeat from
other players within their community. If players have hunted
or fished in excess of their monthly target, they can sell the
surplus to other hunters in need or to the local market. As in
reality, hunting wildmeat for subsistence purposes is legal, while
trading it is illegal. In the game, this means that every time a
player wants to sell any excess meat, the game master throws
the dice and players run the risk of being caught by the police,
having their meat confiscated and being fined. In scenario 2,
players live in a connected community and have access to grocery
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TABLE 1 | The table shows the energy and price required to perform each activity in the game, the respective rewards and, for hunting only, the number of attempts
possible.
Min Energy required Reward (COP and kg) Min price (COP) Min price (COP) Min # of attempts
All scenarios* All scenarios Scenario 1-3 Scenario 4 All scenarios
Activity Low water High water Low water High water Low water High water Low water High water Low water High water
Paid job 5 5 200,000 $ – – – – – –
Logging 5 5 200,000 $ – – – – – –
Farming 5 5 100,000 $ – – – – – –
Fishing 1 1 4 kg – – – – – –
Hunting 1 1 1 – 3,000 3,000 10,000 10,000 1 1
Hunting 2 3 3 – 10,000 10,000 25,000 25,000 2 2
Hunting 3 6 2 – 20,000 50,000 35,000 70,000 3 1
Hunting 4 10 2 – 30,000 70,000 45,000 90,000 4 1
This last variable indicates how many times hunters can draw/hunt within each territory depending on the energy allocated. Activities reward, price and number of attempts are all based
on the minimum energy required to perform each activity. *Paid job and Logging become available for players only from scenario 2.
shops that sell industrial meats, and to an alternative source of
income, a job offered either by the town council or by a logging
company. The former refers to a job performed in town (such
as construction worker), the latter one to a job in the forest.
Meat trade is still illegal. Scenario 3 represents the situation
where the Colombian government changes the requirements for
obtaining a commercial hunting license and wildmeat trading
becomes legal. This causes certain changes, such as an increase
in the price of ammunition, which can now be legally obtained.
In scenario 4—the final scenario—the legality of the trade has
attracted commercial hunters from elsewhere to converge on the
region, thereby creating competition for the local hunters and
increased pressure on the animal population. In all scenarios,
market prices for fish (5,000 COP/kg), wildmeat (8,000 COP/kg)
and, when available, industrial meat (8,000 COP/Kg) do not
change. When players trade their catches between them, they can
bargain about the price.
The landscape to which the players have access (the
gameboard) hosts three animal species moving and reproducing
according to species-specific characteristics: the lowland paca
(Cuniculus paca), the white-lipped peccary (Tajassu pecari) and
the South American Tapir (Tapirus terrestris). These species have
been chosen because they are popular game species and because
of their different life histories. The paca is a large frugivorous
rodent present across the whole Neotropics (Emmons, 2016).
It can be encountered both in the forest as well as in the
farming areas close to the villages and it is one of the most
common species of prey caught by the local hunters (Sandrin
et al., 2016). They occupy a relatively small home range and
their mass ranges from 7 to 12 kg (Ojasti, 1996). The peccary
has similar distribution compared to the paca but a higher
weight (25–40 kg) and a much larger home range (Gottdenker
and Bodmer, 1998). They are a nomadic species and move in
herds of a few individuals up to a few hundreds. The tapir
is a large-bodied solitary herbivore and with its 150–250 kg it
represents the holy grail for hunters (Robinson and Redford,
1986). It plays a key role in the forest’s dynamics as a seed
disperser and predator (de Thoisy et al., 2010) and, as the peccary,
it is classified as vulnerable by the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species
(Naveda et al., 2008; Keuroghlian et al., 2013).
The animal population dynamics of these three species are
modeled through an agent-based model, which runs in the
back in support of the tabletop role-playing game and is used
for analytical purposes by the research team. Players do not
have any interaction with the computer interface, only with
the gameboard, where animals are represented by wooden
tokens hidden in four different bags—the hunting territories
(Figure 3). Each token represents an animal individual, either
male or female. Among the animal tokens there are also “empty”
tokens, which indicate when a hunting trip was not successful,
either because no animal was encountered, the target was
missed, or the rifle failed. The initial probability of success—
based on monitoring data from the hunting association—is
set at 80% for all territories. If the number of animals in the
game fluctuates, so will the probability of encounter. At the
suggestion of the hunters, the probability of an encounter will
never surpass 80%. There will always be an incompressible
uncertainty in hunting, no matter how many animals are in
the game. Players do not have any prior knowledge about
the animal populations in the bags and can only acquire
information by hunting.
All individual animals in the game are adults, either female
or male. These individuals reproduce when they are found
within the same territory, and the abundance of their species
is below carrying capacity. Pacas reproduce every season, i.e.,
twice a year. Each male can reproduce with only one female,
generating one offspring with a 50% probability of being either
a male or a female. Peccaries reproduce only every other season,
i.e., once a year, where each male can mate with a maximum
of three females, generating two offspring, each with a 65%
probability of being a female. Tapirs also reproduce only every
other season, but each male can mate with one female only,
generating one offspring, with a 50% probability of being either
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FIGURE 3 | Gameboard during low water (A) and high water (B) season and agent-based model interface during low water (C) and high water (D) season. The
colors in the virtual interface represent the different game species: paca (green), peccary (blue), and tapir (red); the shapes distinguish the gender, females (circles),
males (triangles).
a male or a female. Irrespective of the species, individuals die
only through hunting. There is no natural mortality in our model
(Healy, 2017).
In the game, hunting occurs after all players have allocated
their energy budgets to the portfolio of available activities and
drawn at random one token from the bag corresponding to the
chosen territory. There is no ordered game turn, with players
following the “first come, first served” principle. We deliberately
left this rule flexible to foster discussions among the players about
their practices.
When hunters encounter a female of any species, they
are asked if they want to know whether the female is
pregnant or not. This choice originates from previous workshops
where hunters proposed—as a way to reduce the impact
of hunting—to ban the killing of pregnant individuals. The
research team thus introduced it in the game to stimulate
discussion on the applicability of such rule. Killing a pregnant
female has impacts on the game population size, structure,
and composition. In the game, the consequences of killing a
pregnant female translate to non-reproduction of any individuals
of the respective species and territory in the current game
round. This is an obviously exaggerated effect used to spur the
discussion during the debriefing stage. When players encounter
a peccary as part of a bigger herd (there are at least four
other individuals within the same territory), they are given
the option of killing more individuals in the herd, as it is
likely to happen in reality. Again, for every female, they
must go through the usual set of questions related to its
possible pregnancy.
Once hunting is over for all territories, players have to
check whether they can meet their protein target with the
wildmeat and/or fish they have harvested. If they are still
lacking in protein, they can buy wildmeat from other players
(if these have a surplus), buy fish from the community market
(always available), or, starting from scenario two onwards,
they can buy processed meat from the grocery shop. The
players will also need to cover their expenses (100,000 COP)
using the rewards from the activities or by selling fish or
wildmeat either to other players, retailers or the market.
It is at this stage that the agent-based model calculates
the resulting abundance and distribution of the animals for
the next round, and the tokens in the bags are updated
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accordingly. At every stage of the game, players make their
decisions individually, although communication was never
formally forbidden and some individual decisions might have
been affected by other players. Simplified representations of
the game dynamics are depicted in Figures 4 and 5. For a full
description, see the Overview-Design-Detail (ODD) protocol in
the Supplementary Material.
Statistical Analysis
Throughout the game, the research team monitored and
recorded the decisions of the players as well as their
implications on the abundance and distribution of the
three animal species. Players had to decide the following:
(1) How to allocate their energy budgets to the available
activities (energy budget allocation), (2) where to go hunting
(territory selection), (3) what kind of protein to consume (diet
composition), and (4) which, if any, protein they wanted to
sell (protein reward).
For the analysis of the players’ behavioral data, we used
a multilevel multinomial logistic regression approach. This
method is suitable for the analysis of energy allocation,
territory selection, diet composition and protein reward
FIGURE 4 | Schematic representation of the game dynamics. The colors correspond to different phases of the game: the allocation of energy to different activities (in
yellow) and hunting (in pink). The white round containers indicate questions posed to the players, the hexagonal ones are the game’s outcomes.
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FIGURE 5 | Schematic representation of game dynamics: animal population dynamics (left, in blue) and consumption and market (right, green). The white round
containers indicate questions posed to the players, the hexagonal ones are the game’s outcomes.
because it accounts for the trade-off-character of these
behavioral choices; selecting one behavior precludes performing
another (Koster and McElreath, 2017).
We fit multi-response generalized linear mixed models using
a Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) approach
from the package MCMCglmm (Hadfield, 2010) for R (R
Core Team, 2018). The Bayesian framework provides a
more flexible alternative for the analysis of hierarchical data
compared to a frequentist approach, which is not always
effective for the analysis of multivariate or non-normally
distributed variables (McCulloch and Searle, 2001; Bolker et al.,
2009).
All our multinomial models follow a categorical (generalized
Bernoulli) distribution and have response variables of K
categories, with one being the reference level with which the
other categories are contrasted to. For each model, we fitted
three random effects: individual ID of participants, round and
workshop number. Individual ID is nested within workshop
because people’s decisions were measured repeatedly within
each workshop and no one participated to more than one
workshop. We fitted round as a random effect to account not
only for potential temporal autocorrelation between successive
rounds but also for the decomposition of the game session
into two games following each other; the game was reset to
initial conditions at the beginning of round 3. This implied
that round 1 of scenario 1 was more similar to round 1
of scenario 3.
For the analysis of the animal population, we fit three
generalized linear models with a Gaussian distribution, one for
each animal species, using as response variable the population
growth rate, calculated as:
r = N(t + 1)/N(t) (1)
Where N is the number of individuals of the focal species at
round t and round t+1. In this case, our only random effect
is workshop.
For both the behavioral and the animal population analyses,
we supplied the models with weakly informative priors for the
fixed effect parameters and for the variance-covariance matrices.
For each model we first ran four parallel chains and we used
the Gelman-Rubin diagnostics to check whether the chains
converged to the same posterior distribution, an indication that
the process is not happening by chance (Gelman and Rubin,
1992). Number of iterations, thinning and burn-in period for
eachmodel were determined using diagnostic plots from the coda
package (Plummer et al., 2006).
Energy Allocation to Activities
The activity model tested whether scenario and season had an
effect on how people allocated their energy to different activities.
The K possible categories were as follows: hunting, farming,
fishing and income activities. Paid job and logging were pulled
together in the same category because players considered them
both as activities providing a fixed income independently of
whether it was a job performed in the town or in the forest.
Hunting was also represented by only one category, with the four
different territories pulled together. Farming was our reference
category. As fixed effects, we included scenario, season, the
interaction between the two and themoney availability of players.
The model was run for 300,000 iterations with a burn-in of
100,000 and thinning of 10.
Hunting Territory Selection
Not all players chose to go hunting at every time step. When
they did, they needed to decide where. This model tested whether
scenario and season had an effect on hunting territory selection.
For thismodel, we selected only the observations in which players
did allocate some energy to hunting. The categories were the four
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different hunting territories, with hunting territory 1 being the
reference. As for the previous model, fixed effects were scenario,
season with their interaction and money availability. The model
was run for 300,000 iterations with a burn-in of 150,000 and
thinning of 10.
Choice to Kill
Within hunting, we also intended to examine players’ decisions
concerning pregnant females and peccaries’ herds. However, in
both cases the sample size was too small to fit the models.
Protein Consumption
At the end of the round, players needed to decide how to
satisfy their protein target. There were three different kinds of
protein that they could choose from:wildmeat, fish and industrial
meat. Fish was always locally sourced. Explanatory variables were
money availability and the amount of wildmeat hunted. The latter
indicated whether players had hunted nowildmeat at all (“none”),
less than the 20 kg target (“little”) or as much as or above their
20 kg target (“enough”). The model was run for 150,000 iterations
with a burn-in of 30,000 and thinning of 10.
Protein Sale
This model examined how players satisfied their budget target.
They could gain money by performing income activities, by
farming and by selling the wildmeat and the fish they collected
during the round. Explanatory variables are scenario and season.
The model was run for 40,000 iterations with a burn-in of 10,000
and thinning of 10.
Animal Populations
Wefitted threemodels with Gaussian distribution and population
growth rate for paca, peccary and tapir as response variable. As
explanatory variable, we used the proportion of energy dedicated
to hunting by all players at every round for every workshop.
Hunting territory and season seem not to play an important
role as shown by DIC (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002) and by the
overlapping confidence interval of the posterior probabilities.
Models were run for 250,000 iterations with a burn-in of 50,000
and thinning of 10.
RESULTS
Energy Allocation to Activities
The probability of allocating energy to hunting or fishing in
scenario 1 did not differ between low and high water (Figure 6).
In this scenario, income activities were not available and model
predictions for this activity were virtually equal to zero. In
scenario 2, when alternative sources of income and protein
became available, less energy was allocated to hunting compared
to scenario 1, in both seasons. In scenario 2, the probability of
allocating energy to hunting was higher in the high-water season.
The same was true for fishing. The probability of allocating
energy to income activities reached a peak of 60.2% (CI =
50.2–66%) in low water and dropped to 29% in high water
(CI = 22.6–33.6%) in season 2. When trade became legal, in
scenario 3, the probability of allocating energy to hunting rose
again substantially in both seasons. Income activities on the
FIGURE 6 | Probability of choosing each activity at every season and
scenarios with money availability held constant at the sample mean. The
confidence intervals are the 95th percentile intervals, as calculated from the
posterior samples of the model. In gray is the reference level (farming).
TABLE 2 | MCMC results for the multinomial regression: we report the posterior
mean and the 95% credible interval for energy budget allocation model.
Variable ScenarioWater Posterior
mean
Lower 95%
CI
Upper 95%
CI
Money availability All All 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fishing All All 0.00 −1.16 1.35
Hunting All All 0.76 −0.36 2.16
Income All All −2.58 −3.86 −1.23
Fishing All High −0.17 −1.29 1.08
Hunting All High 0.25 −0.87 1.49
Income All High −1.28 −2.64 0.05
Fishing 2 All −1.01 −2.21 0.13
Hunting 2 All −1.58 −2.79 −0.47
Farming is not shown as it is the reference level and its probabilities are calculated by
subtracting from 1 the posterior means of the other activities.
other hand became less popular and represented less than a
quarter of the energy budget in both seasons. In the 4th and
final scenario, when competition became fierce, players chose
again to allocate substantially more energy to income activities
and less to hunting compared to scenario 3, independently of
the season. Across all scenarios, fishing and farming were the
least affected by the socio-economic changes occurring, except
in the low water round of scenario 2 when paid job was the
preferred choice (Table 2).
Across the nine workshops, only one player stopped hunting
starting from scenario 2. He was the only non-indigenous player.
Except this one case, players never stopped hunting, even when
given access to alternative sources of protein and income.
Hunting Territory Selection
The territory model examined where players who allocated
energy to hunting, chose to go hunting. As shown in Figure 7,
territory selection varied between seasons within scenarios and
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FIGURE 7 | Probability of choosing each hunting territory at every season and
scenarios with money availability held constant at the sample mean. The
confidence intervals are the 95th percentile intervals, as calculated from the
posterior samples of the model. In gray is the reference level (hunting in
territory 1).
TABLE 3 | We report the posterior mean and the 95% credible interval for the
territory selection model.
Variable ScenarioWater Posterior
mean
Lower 95%
CI
Upper 95%
CI
Money availability All All <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Territory 2 All All 0.36 −0.44 1.29
Territory 3 All All −1.05 −1.91 −0.10
Territory 4 All All −1.35 −2.22 −0.36
Territory 2 All High −0.65 −1.86 0.34
Territory 3 All High 1.29 0.04 2.29
Territory 4 All High 1.37 0.15 2.44
Territory 2 2 All −0.17 −1.18 1.00
Territory 3 2 All −1.35 −2.72 0.06
Territory 4 2 All −1.17 −2.52 0.23
Territory 2 3 All 0.06 −0.47 0.62
Territory 3 3 All 0.87 0.22 1.50
Territory 4 3 All −0.19 −1.02 0.67
Territory 2 4 All 0.25 −0.72 1.34
Territory 3 4 All −1.75 −3.03 −0.47
Territory 4 4 All 1.01 −0.04 2.18
Territory 2 2 High 0.28 −0.82 1.42
Territory 3 2 High 0.25 −1.16 1.64
Territory 4 2 High 0.69 −0.70 2.05
Territory 2 3 High 0.13 −0.71 0.94
Territory 3 3 High −1.27 −2.12 −0.41
Territory 4 3 High −0.53 −1.58 0.48
Territory 2 4 High 0.32 −0.76 1.39
Territory 3 4 High 0.88 −0.42 2.16
Territory 4 4 High −1.97 −3.14 −0.80
Hunting in territory 1 is not shown as it is the reference level and its probabilities are
calculated by subtracting from 1 the posterior means of hunting in the other territories.
between scenarios. Overall, players allocated more energy to
territory 2 and less energy to territories 3 and 4 compared to
territory 1, our reference level (Table 3). If we compare between
TABLE 4 | We report the posterior mean and the 95% credible interval for the
consumption model.
Variable Wildmeat
hunted
Posterior
mean
Lower 95%
CI
Upper 95%
CI
Money availability All <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Industrial meat None −1.30 −2.04 −0.51
Wildmeat None −6.46 −7.63 −5.30
Industrial meat Little −1.44 −2.22 −0.65
Wildmeat Little −0.29 −1.00 0.52
Industrial meat Enough −1.29 −2.02 −0.45
Wildmeat Enough 2.07 1.35 2.86
Consumption of fish is not shown as it is the reference level and its probabilities are
calculated by subtracting from 1 the posterior means of wildmeat and industrial meat.
FIGURE 8 | Protein consumption model. The colored areas correspond to the
probability of choosing each protein type depending on the amount of money
available. The gray areas are the confidence intervals for wildmeat and for
industrial meat (fish is the reference level and therefore confidence intervals are
not given).
seasons, independently of the scenario, territory 2 was less visited
during high water compared to territory 1, while territories 3 and
4 were more visited.
In both scenarios 1 and 2, during the low water season players
had a higher probability to hunt in territories 1 and 2—which
are closer to the village—compared to territories 3 and 4—which
are further away from the village. When an alternative source of
income became available (scenario 2), the probability of visiting
territories 3 and 4 substantially decreased compared to scenario
1, meaning that in scenario 2, during low water, players preferred
to visit hunting territories closer to the village.
When trade became legal in scenario 3, territory 2 was still
the most likely visited territory during the low water season
(mean = 45.1%, CI = 36–52.2%). However, there was a 27%
(CI = 20.9–31.1%) and 27.7% (CI = 19.2–32.7%) probability of
choosing territory 3 in low and high water, respectively, despite
the energetic and monetary effort required to reach it when
the water is low. Similarly, when competition came in (scenario
4), players had a 24.8% (CI = 16.5–28.9%) chance of visiting
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FIGURE 9 | Protein sale model. The colored areas correspond to the
probability of selling each protein type at every season and scenario. The
confidence intervals are the 95th percentile intervals, as calculated from the
posterior samples of the model. In gray is the reference level (reward from
farming).
territory 4, the farthest of all, during the low water season,
and the probability to hunt in this territory never rose above
10% in all other scenarios. On the other hand, the probability
of choosing territory 3 in scenario 4 compared to scenario 3
decreased significantly in both seasons.
Choice to Kill
Overall, players drew 215 times a female token from the sacks. In
80% of the cases they wanted to know whether it was pregnant
while in the remaining 20% they did not want to know. Out of
the 80%, 59 females were not pregnant, 61 were pregnant and 52
escaped the hunter. It is the 61 cases where females were actually
pregnant that interested us. In 15% of the cases players decided
to kill the female.
Players across all workshops encountered a herd of peccaries
only 25 times. Twelve percentage of players did not want to kill
any additional individual, 48% killed one extra individual, 20%
killed two more, 12% three more and 8% four more.
However, in both cases, there was not enough variation across
scenarios and money availability to be detected by the models.
Although the sample size was too small to prove any trend,
data suggest that if players would have been able to recognize a
pregnant female during the hunt, they would, in most cases, not
kill it. In the case of the peccaries it seems that most players would
kill at least one additional individual but only few would go for a
higher catch.
Protein Consumption
It is clear that both the amount of money and wildmeat players
had at the end of the round affected their diet (Table 4). When
they did not hunt any wildmeat, they did not consume any and
only few bought wildmeat from other players (Figure 8). At low
levels of income, they had an 80.4% probability of consuming
fish (either fished or bought). With increasing income, the
TABLE 5 | We report the posterior mean and the 95% credible interval for the
protein sale model.
Variable ScenarioWater Posterior
mean
Lower 95%
CI
Upper 95%
CI
Fishing 1 Low −2.38 −3.32 −1.29
Fishing 1 High −1.76 −2.61 −0.63
Income 1 Low −4.68 −5.90 −3.48
Income 1 High −4.39 −5.76 −3.06
Hunting 1 Low 1.54 0.77 2.53
Hunting 1 High 0.98 0.01 1.96
Fishing 2 Low −2.19 −3.05 −1.39
Fishing 2 High −1.84 −2.77 −1.05
Income 2 Low 0.78 −0.05 1.57
Income 2 High 1.88 1.00 2.67
Hunting 2 Low 0.61 −0.20 1.41
Hunting 2 High −1.09 −1.97 −0.28
Fishing 3 Low −1.22 −2.01 −0.18
Fishing 3 High −1.37 −2.25 −0.28
Income 3 Low 0.52 −0.27 1.54
Income 3 High 0.86 −0.08 1.84
Hunting 3 Low 1.04 0.25 2.05
Hunting 3 High 1.85 0.99 2.93
Fishing 4 Low −1.84 −2.78 −0.95
Fishing 4 High −2.12 −3.00 −1.23
Income 4 Low 0.93 0.13 1.73
Income 4 High 0.76 −0.16 1.53
Hunting 4 Low 0.46 −0.37 1.26
Hunting 4 High 0.43 −0.51 1.19
Farming is not shown as it is the reference level and its probabilities are calculated by
subtracting from 1 the posterior means of hunting in the other territories.
probability of consuming industrial meat increased to a
maximum of 70.4% (CI = 49.4–84.9%), basically replacing the
fish fraction.
When players did collect some wildmeat (“little”)—though
below their protein target—they consumed it and complemented
it with fish and/or industrial meat depending on the money
availability. The proportion of the protein budget covered
with wildmeat ranged from 35.4% (CI = 21.8–49.7%) at
low levels of income to 68.2% (CI = 59.4–72.5%) at high
levels of income. Despite being constantly lower, industrial
meat consumption doubled as well, rising from about 11.2%
(CI = 6.8–15.8%) to 21.5% (CI = 18.6–23%) of the total
protein intake.
When the wildmeat collected was equal to or higher than
the target (“enough”), players mainly consumed wildmeat,
independently of the money availability. In this case, wildmeat
represented between 85% (CI = 74.5–90.8%) and 95.4% (CI =
93.5–96%) of the total protein intake. Despite the possibility
of meeting their protein target with wildmeat only, players
consumed a relatively constant amount of industrial meat,
ranging between 2.9% (CI= 2.5–3.2%) and 3.2% (CI= 3.1–3.4%)
along the income axis. As in all other cases, fish consumption
decreased with increasing income, declining from 12–1.4%.
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FIGURE 10 | Impact of hunting on the animal population.
TABLE 6 | We report the posterior mean and the 95% credible interval for the
three animal population models.
Species Variable Posterior
mean
Lower 95%
CI
Upper 95%
CI
PACA
Intercept 1.02 0.93 1.12
Hunting Proportion −1.19 −1.79 −0.59
PECCARY
Intercept 1.03 0.86 1.19
Hunting Proportion −1.71 −2.77 −0.64
TAPIR
Intercept 0.85 0.67 1.04
Hunting Proportion −0.85 −2.00 0.29
Protein Reward
In the absence of another source of income (scenario 1), wildmeat
was the players’ main source of income (Figure 9, Table 5). In
the presence of an alternative source of income (scenario 2–4), a
smaller fraction of players’ income came from selling wildmeat.
Yet, when wildmeat trading is legal and hunting competition is
absent (scenario 3), a substantial fraction of the players’ income
originated from wildmeat. Across all scenarios, the proportion
of income originating from wildmeat and paid jobs fluctuated
substantially compared to the relatively constant contribution
of fishing and farming. Overall, relatively little money is gained
through fishing.
Animal Populations
The only process affecting the animal population was hunting,
as defined per game mechanisms. Hunting can not only remove
animals from the system but can also stop reproduction if a
pregnant female is killed during a round. Carrying capacity could
temporarily halt animal reproduction but it was never reached
in any of the game workshops and therefore played no role in
defining animal abundance.
The animal population models showed that the higher the
proportion of energy dedicated to hunting, the lower the
population growth rate (Figure 10, Table 6).
DISCUSSION
A common concern about experimental games is to what degree
what happens under experimental conditions can be extrapolated
to explain real-life behavior (Jackson, 2012). For a model to be
able to support discussion about the real world, it first needs
to seem credible to the users (Checkland, 1995). To ensure the
relevance of our game, we designed it, tested it and refined
it with the actors of the socio-ecological system we wanted to
represent. Gaming and the collective discussions that followed
during the debriefing sessions served as triangulation. Players
reported that the game represents well the constraints that they
have to face in their everyday lives. It created time for self-
reflection. “The game gave us the time to analyze our everyday
practices and it demonstrated to us that through a game we can
understand what is happening in the real world” (Workshop 2,
Player ID 2.3). Additionally, most players’ decisions departed
from the assumptions of maximization and rationality common
in economic theory. Players seldom chose the most profitable
activities, despite the shortage of money. Similarly, they sold
one kind of protein to buy another one at exactly the same
price, even though they could have met their target with the
initial protein collected. This is a clear example of the difference
between the game’s internal and external validity. A decision
that is consistent with the rules of the game is internally valid.
A decision that makes no sense in regard to the rules but
has nevertheless a meaning for the players because of their
desires, beliefs and intentions they brought from real life is
externally valid. Interpreting choices in the game as accurate
representations of social realities is risky, even when the game
actions match field data (Le Page et al., 2014). More importantly,
it is not actually necessary that game choices represent accurately
real life behavior (Speelman et al., 2017). The value of the
games we use within the ComMod approach lies in their
ability to generate collective learning, to foster critical thinking
and to encourage creative actions in response to the issues
encountered in the game (Checkland, 1995; Le Page et al., 2014).
Acknowledging that the game is a tool and not a goal (Verburg
et al., 2016), the TICOYA game allowed hunters to hold such
in-depth discussions.
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The scenarios played in the TICOYA game represent the
current situation of the communities included in the study
and a glimpse of their potential future. The current reality
of the communities lies along a gradient between the first
two scenarios. While the context in Puerto Nariño is closer
to the one described in scenario 2, some of the most remote
communities along the river are still better represented by
scenario 1, andmost communities are somewhere in between. On
the other hand, scenario 3 and 4 represent options that—though
plausible—have not occurred yet. Scenario 3 represents the
political objective of the hunter’s association, scenario 4 a likely
outcome threatening community management. When players
discuss their strategies in scenarios 1 and 2, they can draw upon
real life examples depending on their community of residence.
When they move to scenarios 3 and 4, they build their narratives
through their values’ and aspirations’ lenses. While we should
not infer directly real-life responses based on the actions in
the game, we can nonetheless use the game as a metaphor
of reality to foster in-depth discussion on real-life strategies
with the hunters.
Brown (2002) hypothesized that providing forest dwellers
with income-generating activity and domesticmeat would reduce
their dependency on wild meat, in turn decreasing hunting
pressure. This is supposed to be particularly relevant for South
America, where intense livestock production has the potential
to cover the protein demand of the Amazon basin (Rushton
et al., 2005). Domestic meat, though expensive, is indeed
easily found in the grocery shops of Puerto Nariño. In the
game, we observed a substantial decrease in hunting effort
in scenario 2 compared to scenario 1 when alternative job
opportunities and industrial meat become available, supporting
the aforementioned hypothesis. Participants in the game
workshops confirmed that if offered a job by a logging company
or by the town council, they would accept it, especially during
the low water season when forest streams and ponds are
dry and hunting requires more time and energy investment.
Most participants have indeed taken up job opportunities in
their everyday life and reduced their hunting effort. Their
wages allow them to buy expensive goods that they do not
produce themselves but are available in the grocery shops and
have become essential in their diets, such as vegetable oil,
sugar and rice. During the workshop debriefings, participants
claimed that in real life, they would still dedicate some
time to hunting—though mainly in territories closer to the
villages as they would not have the time anymore to go
for longer expeditions deeper into the forest: “If I have a
job, I can work during the day and go hunting during
the night, it helps saving money” (workshop 4, player ID
4.5). Game results are consistent with players’ statements.
In scenario 2 they allocated significantly less energy to
territories 3 and 4, those farther away from the village, during
both seasons.
Participants gave several reasons for not giving up hunting in
their everyday lives. First, the jobs that the hunters of the Ticoya
reserve have access to are generally short-term and unstable, i.e.,
employees might have work 1 day but not the next one, and there
are often delays for the generally meager payments. After all,
hunters with low levels of formal education have little prospects
of finding a job. In these conditions, although risky, hunting can
be much more profitable than any of the jobs they can get. In
addition, hunting offers a safety net for when salary does not
come on time or for when it is insufficient to cover all expenses.
This reflects the classic strategy of forest dwellers, composed of a
mosaic of activities that complement each other at different levels
depending on the season and on specific needs (Zenteno et al.,
2013). This dynamic structure is one more reason why hunting
might be preferred over a regular job whose intrinsic rigidity is
less compatible with the agricultural cycle (Brown and Williams,
2003). All except one participant of the game workshops engaged
in slash and burn cultivation, an activity that requires high levels
of labor inputs at discontinuous times.
Cultural attributes alongside taste preference and diet
diversification have also been mentioned in the workshop
debriefings to justify the persistence of hunting effort in real
life. Participants stated that they hunt because they like the
taste of wildmeat and because it allows them to vary from
a fish and canned meat diet—the latter considered unhealthy
and a threat to traditional practices. Previous studies suggested
that wildmeat—although routinely consumed—is not the favored
source of animal protein in Amazonian towns (Nardoto et al.,
2011; Morsello et al., 2015). However, these studies focused on a
random sample of mainly urban households. Participants in our
study were all hunters of medium to very small rural settlements
who have cultural connections to wildmeat consumption and
hunting practices. Some players who, in the game, sold wildmeat
to buy industrial meat at the exact same price, justified themselves
saying that their children prefer beef and chicken meat over
wildmeat. This is in accordance with a previous study on
children’s preferences which included some of the same rural
communities (van Vliet et al., 2015a). One player added, “We
abandoned our culture, we are adopting the lifestyle of mestizo
people and our children do not want anything to do with our
indigenous culture” (workshop 3, player ID 3.4).
Consumption is not driven by cultural attributes only but by
income and prices too, with wildmeat consumption falling with
the decreasing price of domestic meat and vice versa (Ayres et al.,
1991; Wilkie and Godoy, 2001). Economic theory suggests that
an increasing income will increase the consumption of a certain
good if there are no alternatives or if it is considered a superior
good (in which case its consumption would be even higher).
Consumption of that specific good would follow an inverted
“U”- shaped curve (Kuznets, 1955), increasing up to a tipping
point in which consumers—whose income has substantially
increased—switch to other products that have become affordable.
In our game, an increase in income led to an increase in
wildmeat consumption when wildmeat was available. Industrial
meat consumption doubled when little wildmeat was available.
The increase in wildmeat consumption with increasing income
and despite access to alternative products such as fish and
industrial meat is an indication that in the game, wildmeat is
considered a superior good. However, the parallel increase of
industrial meat consumption suggests that we are close to the
curve’s expected tipping point. Independent of the amount of
wildmeat available, consumption of fish constantly decreased
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with increasing income, suggesting that fish is an inferior good,
consumed because there are no affordable substitutes. van Vliet
et al. (2015b) support our findings by showing that children
have a very low preference for fish compared to other proteins—
especially egg and beef.
Understanding the drivers behind wildmeat consumption
is essential for designing effective policies for management of
wildlife hunting and trading (Schenck et al., 2006). Our results
suggest that wildmeat is consumed—and thus hunted—despite
the presence of affordable substitutes, although increasing
incomes led to increased consumption of industrial meat. The
way that players behaved in the game, their statements and
their real-life examples suggest that economic development—
the availability of alternative sources of income and of
protein—could drive the consumption of wildmeat either up
or down depending on the initial level of income. Empirical
case studies show both trajectories in which additional incomes
and changes in market prices decreased reliance on wildmeat
(Ayres et al., 1991; Wilkie and Godoy, 2001), or increased it
because of better access to more effective hunting equipment
(Damania et al., 2005), or had no significant effect on resource
exploitation (Torell et al., 2010).
Our results also indicate a more immediate impact of income
alternatives on the spatial footprint of hunting. As workshop
participants themselves admitted, if they had a job they would
concentrate their hunting effort in areas easily reachable from the
village—especially during the dry season when accessing more
remote regions by boat is not possible. This situation would
put additional pressure on an area already affected by habitat
fragmentation and human disturbance (e.g., slash and burn
agriculture, logging and noise). The lack of hunting heterogeneity
over time and space could cause local wildlife populations to
deplete over time and could prevent it from being replenished
from other less hunted populations (Van Vliet et al., 2010).
In the game as in reality, the risk of getting the meat
confiscated when players decided to sell is very low. Out of
the 40 participants, only two players had had their wildmeat
confiscated within the game, while seven of them stated that they
have been confiscated in real life. Most trade occurs locally within
the communities and none of the participants bring the meat
to the department capital where control is much stricter (van
Vliet et al., 2015c). When trade became legal (scenarios 3 and 4),
players carried away a guided thought experiment since, though
they aspire to it, they have never experienced legal trade first
hand and their narratives are not based on concrete practices but
on their values and aspirations only. Within the game, hunting
effort substantially increased in both seasons once trade became
legal. It increased particularly in the most distant territories
from the community, territories 3 and 4, during the low water
season. This is an indication that despite the cost and effort,
players perceived hunting as worthier than other activities. When
trade was illegal (scenario 2), hunting effort was significantly
lower but, although income could be easily obtained through
a regular salary, wildmeat was still sold—especially during the
high-water season.
Sustainable wildlife management is gaining recognition under
the assumption that a more flexible framework that takes into
account the rights and the knowledge of local communities
would enhance both conservation and human welfare (Miller
et al., 2011). Acknowledging and strengthening the engagement
of the human dimension is considered crucial for effective
conservation decision-making (Bennett et al., 2016). Despite a
general consensus toward sustainable use, wildmeat trade is still
strongly criminalized in Colombia and forest dwellers are forced
to walk a fine line between subsistence hunting and illegal trade
prosecutable by law (van Vliet and Gomez, 2015). Overlooking
the role that wildmeat plays in the food security, family economy
and cultural identity of rural communities poses a problem for
communities and might well be detrimental for the wildlife itself
(Nasi et al., 2008). Our results show that players sold wildmeat
independently of whether the trade was legal or not. Participants
confirmed that they do often sell part of their harvest, a fact
also shown by a previous study that included hunters from
Puerto Nariño (van Vliet et al., 2014b). The customers are
generally neighbors and other community members or, more
rarely, restaurants in Puerto Nariño.
A common concern among conservationists is that legalizing
wildmeat trade could increase hunting pressure by legitimizing
potentially unsustainable levels of hunting, leading affected
populations to extirpation (Wilkie et al., 2006). Of the 40
participants, only eight said that they would not hunt more
if the wildmeat trade became legal because they hunt for the
subsistence of their family and they are concerned with the
animals’ long-term viability. The other 32 participants declared
they would indeed hunt more, endorsing what happened in the
game where hunting effort was higher in scenario 3 compared to
scenario 2. For most, legal trade would represent an opportunity
to have an extra income for everyday necessities. This shows how
the concept of subsistence for rural communities has a wider
meaning compared to the official definition (Law 84 of 1989,
article 30), which restricts legal wildlife use to food provision for
the hunter and his/her family. Only three participants mentioned
commercial hunting, and the possibility of selling large quantities
of wildmeat at the market.
In the scenario 4, we introduced in the game some of the
changes that the legality of the trade might bring, such as
higher prices for hunting equipment and external competition.
Most participants, when confronted with the new circumstances,
declared they were not aware of the conditions that legal trade
could entail. Taxation and competition had a negative effect
on the game’s hunting effort, which significantly decreased,
though the effect was not equal for all territories. Players
reacted to competition by allocating some of their time to
a paid job, which again increased in popularity compared to
the previous scenario without external players. However, no
particular action was taken against the competing hunters that
invaded the territory—except for a few occasions in which players
rushed to draw animal tokens before the external competitors.
Indigenous hunters in this region have implicit norms that
regulate hunting access to the forest adjacent to the communities.
These rules transcend national borders and are implemented
by all neighboring communities, whether they are in Colombia,
Perú or Brazil. The competition issue seems to arise only when
intruders come from other regions.
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The game and the scenarios explored within this study have
been designed according to the context of the Ticoya indigenous
reserve in Colombia. However, the guiding hypotheses are
relevant formost tropical and sub-tropical regions where hunting
and trade of wildmeat persists (Milner-Gulland et al., 2003;
Brashares et al., 2011). In the Congo basin, for example, people
also hunt wildmeat for food—whether directly consumed or sold
to third parties—but extraction rates are higher compared to
the less studied Amazon basin (Nasi et al., 2011). While rural
consumption patterns in the two basins are comparable (Nasi
et al., 2011), the rates are different at the urban level. Despite
increasing acknowledgment of South American wildmeat urban
consumption (Parry et al., 2014; van Vliet et al., 2014a, 2015a),
the volumes of trade and consumption in African cities have
yet to be overcome (Wilkie et al., 2005; Mbete et al., 2011).
This is also due to the smaller livestock production of many
Central African countries compared to South America and
the consequent lack of valuable alternative sources of protein
and income (Rushton et al., 2005; Bennett et al., 2007). We
expect our results to be similar—though more trade-focused—
in the African context given similar socio-economic conditions
of the study area, such as distance to the next urban settlement.
Despite differences at the market and institutional level, the
forest dwellers of the tropics are facing comparable challenges
and opportunities. Over the long term, we expect hunters—
in Colombia as well as in other tropical regions—to benefit
from the increasingly available alternative livelihoods but at
the same time to be lured by a bigger and more accessible
market for wildmeat products. The sustainable use of wildlife has
the potential to tip the balance toward long-term conservation
while at the same time providing a legal source of income
and protein.
The aim of this study was to explore hunters’ behavior
within the environment of a game setting and relate them to
their everyday practices, while eliciting individual and collective
values, attitudes and aspirations. Specifically, we looked at the
effects of policy interventions that are already partially in place in
the Amazon region (alternative livelihoods) or that are strongly
demanded by local communities (trade legalization). Our results
support the hypothesis that providing alternatives would indeed
decrease overall hunting effort but might also focus its footprint
on smaller areas, canceling the positive effects of temporal and
spatial hunting heterogeneity. Legalizing trade could encourage
commercial and therefore less sustainable hunting, except when
increased prices and competition make it less attractive. This
is so unless communities self-organize to control practices and
exclude free riders.
Ultimately, for policies to be effective, they need to take into
account the coping strategies of the people they are directed to.
Our game proved to be a powerful tool to this end, capable
of generating a safe and inclusive environment for stakeholders
to discuss pressing yet delicate issues such as illegal trade and
unsustainable hunting. Within and after the game, people do not
fear being explicit about what drives their actions and, eventually,
the whole system.
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